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Essay
NORM THEORY AND THE FUTURE OF THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT†
INTRODUCTION
The way George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the
1
United States was extraordinary in ways that we are still assessing. In
addition to Bush’s contested presidential victory, the election produced an unprecedented 50-50 split in the Senate, with Vice President
Richard Cheney able to cast a tie-breaking vote. Because many Sen2
ate votes on presidential appointments are likely to be close, George
W. Bush’s presidency provides a unique setting for testing the robustness of appointments norms: the behavioral regularities of presidents
and senators regarding appointments that persist in the absence of
formal rules and that deviations from which trigger sanctions.3
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† Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Jack
Balkin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael Dorf, Chris Eisgruber, Deborah Gerhardt, Paul Schwartz,
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1. These circumstances are well known: George W. Bush became President after winning
a majority of the Electoral College by the second-smallest margin in American history. Bush is
also the first person in over 100 years to have won the presidency despite having lost the popular vote. Moreover, Bush became President after an intense, postelection contest over Florida’s
electors, a contest ultimately settled by the Supreme Court’s controversial 5-4 decision in Bush
v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
2. The fifty-fifty split in the Senate raised the possibility that any defection in either party
on a vote or in party membership would significantly affect the appointments process. In fact,
Vermont Senator James Jeffords’ decision to leave the Republican party and to become an independent shifted control of the Senate back to the Democrats. Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Senator
Plans Shift, Giving Democrats Control in Setback for White House, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001, at
A1. Jeffords’ switch ensures trouble for Bush appointments. Even before they took control of
the Senate, Democratic senators had signaled to President Bush that they had already been
preparing for pitched battles over judicial nominations, which are traditionally given the least
deference of any category of presidential nomination. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
3. Norm theorists tend to focus predominantly on social norms, though they generally disagree over the definition, range, origins, and the reasons for the fluctuations or evolution of
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In this Essay, I examine national political leaders’ prospects for
taking advantage of existing appointments norms or inventing new
4
ones. Using examples from the presidencies of Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush, I argue that national political leaders’ compliance
with and manipulation of norms can facilitate the fulfillment of personal or party agendas on federal appointments. While the constitutional structure and Senate rules governing appointments generally
are resistant to formal alteration, the same is not true of the institutional norms governing appointments. The fact that some appointments norms are in flux raises the possibility that they are more amenable to change than the formal structure and rules of the
appointments process, which change only under extraordinary circumstances.5 Appreciating the nature of flux in appointments norms
is crucial for determining how norms can be managed to achieve certain results in, and, possibly, to achieve reform of, the appointments
process.
To appreciate the nature and significance of the flux in appointments norms, one needs initially to understand the range of appointments norms. While many appointments norms have been discussed
such norms. Nevertheless, social norms are commonly understood as behavioral regularities
among private actors that persist in the absence of formal rules and that trigger expressions of
disapproval or sanctions when deviated from. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS 7-8 (2000) (“What distinguishes social norms from other behavioral regularities is that
departure from them provokes sanction.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051, 1127 (2000) (defining social norms “as social attitudes that specify what behaviors an
actor ought to exhibit”). Norm theorists recognize at least three kinds of social norms—rationality-limiting, preference-changing, and equilibrium-selection norms. Kaushik Basu, Social
Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
476, 476-77 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). In contrast to social norms, institutional norms operate
within and sometimes between various institutions. In this Essay, my focus is on such norms.
One interesting question, not yet studied in detail by norm theorists, is how institutional norms
relate to social norms. My sense is that social norms define a relatively large realm of activity,
one possible subcategory of which may be institutional norms. Within this subcategory is a subset that involves the behavioral regularities of the leaders of national political institutions developed within the loose constitutional framework of checks and balances to constrain or guide
their interaction over shared areas of responsibility, including, but not limited to, appointments
matters.
4. My analysis begins where my book, MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000), ended. A
basic thesis of the book is that appointments norms can be inferred from the patterns and practices of presidents and senators throughout American history. These institutional norms are the
same as those operating generally in the legislative process. Whereas the book focused on the
patterns and practices of official activity regarding appointments throughout American history,
the focus of this Essay is prospective.
5. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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elsewhere,6 Section I clarifies the application of such norms to subcabinet appointments. Various factors combine to produce more Senate contests over subcabinet than cabinet nominations. These factors
include the comparatively large numbers of subcabinet offices; the
narrower jurisdiction of such offices, allowing their occupants to exercise direct responsibility over ideological battlefields such as civil
rights; the greater vulnerability of subcabinet nominations to logrolling; propensities toward party-line voting; and Senate rules allowing
subcabinet appointments to be thwarted more easily than cabinet
ones.
Moreover, I examine two recent consequences of uncertainty
about which norms govern. The first involves “norm ambiguity,” or
the potential for development of a new norm when there is conflict
7
over the meaning of an existing norm. An example of such conflict
concerns recent uncertainty about whether sitting U.S. Attorneys
should tender resignations at the outset of new presidential administrations.8 The second consists of responses to the absence of clearly
governing norms, which invites actors to protect or expand their
authority. A recent illustration is the tendency of presidents interested in consolidating control over policymaking to increase the
number and responsibility of staff members who are not subject to
Senate confirmation.9
In Section II, I explore the relevance of norm theory to reform of
the appointments process. First, complying with certain norms (such
10
as senatorial courtesy and the use of moderate rhetoric to create a
framing effect that lowers expectations) can break logjams in judicial
confirmations. Second, appreciating the significance of rhetoric and

6. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 162-74, 301-14 (reviewing various patterns and
practices in the confirmation process and analyzing judicial selection norms); Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the Confirmation Process: Replacing “Despise and Resent” with “Advice and
Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 14-25 (2001) (reviewing the rise and fall of various norms applicable to federal appointments).
7. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
10. “Senatorial courtesy” has three possible meanings. First, it can refer to senators’ expectations that presidents (from the same party) will defer to their preferred choices to fill federal
offices in their respective states. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 143. Second, it can refer to senators’ deference to nominations of members of Congress, particularly other senators, to offices
that require confirmation. Id. at 143-44. Third, it can refer to presidents’ deference to some
senators’ suggested nominations to offices in which they have special interest or expertise. Id. at
144.
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norms in confirmation contests is essential for evaluating whether
some reforms of the confirmation process, such as limiting the questioning of judicial nominees, are feasible. Third, the success of political leaders as norm entrepreneurs depends less on their personal attributes11 than on their manipulation of resources, including their
political support, to withstand retaliation for attempted innovations
and expansions of institutional prerogatives.
I. THE NORMS OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS
If there is any confusion about the norms applicable to different
types of appointments, it likely pertains to the deference Congress
gives the President’s political appointments. This section seeks to
eliminate this confusion. First, I explain the factors affecting how certain institutional norms apply to different kinds of appointments.
Second, I examine the implications of conflict or uncertainty over applicable norms for subcabinet appointments.
A. Factors Influencing Senate Contests over Political Appointments
While senators claim to defer generally to both the President’s
cabinet and subcabinet nominations, there are subtle but significant
differences in the institutional norms governing these two kinds of
nominations. To understand these differences, some clarification of
the nature of Senate deference to cabinet nominees is in order. In all
of American history, the Senate has rejected only eight cabinet nomi12
nations. The rarity of cabinet nominees’ formal rejection reflects
11. I disagree with the noted norm theorist, Eric Posner, who suggests that political leaders
who act as norm entrepreneurs undertake the necessary risks involved with violating existing
norms because of certain personal traits. POSNER, supra note 3, at 32. I suggest political leaders
can be successful norm entrepreneurs when they preserve or expand institutional prerogatives
by means of manipulating or mobilizing core constituencies or political resources. See infra
notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
12. The eight rejected nominees were Roger Taney, as President Jackson’s Treasury Secretary; Caleb Cushing, as President Tyler’s Treasury Secretary; James Green, as President Tyler’s
Treasury Secretary; James Porter, as President Tyler’s Secretary of War; Henry Stanbery, as
Andrew Johnson’s Attorney General; Charles Warren, as President Coolidge’s Attorney General; Lewis Strauss, as President Eisenhower’s Commerce Secretary; and John Tower, as President George H.W. Bush’s Defense Secretary. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 105-06, 164-65. In
my opinion, one theme that conceivably links all of these rejections, with the possible exception
of Senator Tower’s nomination as Defense Secretary, is that each implicated a controversial or
sensitive policy or constitutional issue. See id. at 105 (“The federal appointments process is a
popular forum for senators who disapprove of or dislike a president or some of his policies.”).
But see id. at 164 (suggesting the reasons for some of these rejections were “largely personal”).
Tower’s nomination ran into serious difficulties because of personal misconduct including wom-
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senators’ recognition that cabinet officials will work very closely with
the President.13 They also will be closely identified with the President
who appointed them. Deference to these nominations allows the
President to choose the people on whom he wishes to rely to implement his policy preferences. Cabinet officers report directly to the
President and operate directly under his supervision. Also, because
presidents are held accountable for the laudable or controversial policies of their cabinet officers, senators generally give presidents broad
discretion in choosing them.14

anizing and drinking. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Confirming
Cabinet Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123, 1160-61 (1998)
(discussing the Senate Committee on Armed Services’ “deliberations on Tower’s sex life and his
drinking habits,” which resulted in the Committee’s unfavorable report on Tower’s nomination). These difficulties became fatal in part because of some senators’ concerns that confirming
Tower would send the wrong signal to the military or risk injuring the morale of service personnel who are expected to refrain from, and will be punished, if not driven from the service, for,
similar misbehavior. See, e.g., id. at 1161 (“The majority [on the Committee] . . . emphasized
that a Secretary of Defense also should adhere to a high standard of sobriety and sexual decorum that would serve as a model for military personnel and civilian defense employees.”).
13. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. S2294 (1977) (statement of Sen. Percy) (the President
“should be allowed to have as his closest advisors and policy managers those with whose expertise in a given field he is most comfortable and whose leadership of their Department would
most reflect the President’s priorities”); 105 CONG. REC. S9995 (1959) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall) (“Our President, with the demands and almost inhuman burdens of his position, must
have the people he wants close by to help him.”); 99 CONG. REC. S465 (1953) (statement of Sen.
Morse) (“[T]he President . . . is entitled to have his official family consist of men in whom he has
confidence and men whom [sic] he believes will carry out the policies which will characterize his
administration.”).
14. Several Democrats who crossed party lines to confirm John Ashcroft as Attorney General echoed such sentiments. Consider, for example, statements by Senators Feingold, Dodd,
and Breaux:
This examination of the history [of cabinet appointments] demonstrates that it has
been a nearly continuous custom of the Senate to confirm a President’s nominees to
the Cabinet in all but the very rarest of circumstances. These practices and precedents
thus support the principle that the Senate owes the President substantial deference in
the selection of the Cabinet.
147 CONG. REC. S981 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold);
I do not expect that John Ashcroft will change his views [on many issues] as Attorney
General . . . . I hope that [my vote] will be informative—informative most of all to
John Ashcroft. Listen well, John Ashcroft. There are those of us today who could
easily vote against your confirmation, but have decided to give you a second chance.
147 CONG. REC. S891-92 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd);
I think all Presidents should have the opportunity to pick their own Cabinet. While I
do not agree with the political philosophies of all the cabinet members, I believe it is
the job of the Senate to reject a nomination only if the nominee is clearly unfit for the
office.
Press Release, Senator John Breaux (Feb. 1, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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The Senate’s recent confirmation of all of President George W.
Bush’s cabinet nominations confirms the durability of this deference.
While the unprecedented 50-50 split in the Senate gave the President’s party only the slimmest margin (with Vice President Cheney’s
tie-breaking vote), most of the President’s nominees were confirmed
without controversy. Only one nomination—that of John Ashcroft as
15
Attorney General—was close. Generally, Democrats joined Republicans in overwhelmingly confirming his cabinet nominees.16
The first factor distinguishing subcabinet nominations from cabinet nominations is the percentage of nominations rejected. Although
the percentage of subcabinet nominations rejected is lower than the
17
percentage of cabinet nominations rejected, there are far more subcabinet posts than cabinet posts. Hence, more contests are possible
over subcabinet than cabinet nominations.18
15. The Senate confirmed Ashcroft 58-42. Senate Roll Call on Ashcroft Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2001, at A16. Ashcroft’s margin of victory was the narrowest for any Attorney General
ever, including Edwin Meese III, who received 31 “no” votes in 1985. Alison Mitchell, Senate
Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58-42, Closing a Five Week Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2001, at A1. The next closest vote was for Bush’s nomination of Gale Norton as Interior Secretary, 75-24. Lizette Alvarez, Senate Confirms Nominees for E.P.A. and Interior Posts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A15. The other major contest over a Bush cabinet nominee involved
Linda Chavez, who withdrew her nomination as Labor Secretary after questions arose about the
propriety of her giving money to an illegal alien who lived with her and occasionally performed
services for her and her family. Steven A. Holmes & Frank Bruni, Chavez Cites Bush’s Silence
in Her Decision to Withdraw, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A20.
16. The Senate confirmed President Bush’s cabinet nominees in twelve days, a modern record. The speed and general ease of the confirmations are attributable to several factors, not the
least of which was the decision by the Democratic Senate leadership to accept the legitimacy of
Bush’s presidency rather than turn confirmation proceedings into extensions of the postelection
dispute between Bush and Gore. Not a single Democratic senator provoked a contest over any
of Bush’s cabinet nominees because of concerns about Bush’s path to the presidency (at least
not explicitly). In taking this tack, Senate Democrats refused to comply, at least as of the date of
this publication, with strong public appeals that they block Bush nominees in retaliation for the
illegitimacy of his presidency. For two such appeals from noted legal scholars, see Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (“When sitting justices retire
or die, the Senate should refuse to confirm any nominees offered up by President Bush . . . .
Forty senators should simply make plain that they will block all Supreme Court nominations
until the next presidential election.”); Jack M. Balkin, Bush’s Negative Mandate Narrows His
Nominees, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at B9 (“Under these circumstances, the Senate has the
constitutional authority—and the duty—to hold [the President] to a moderate course. That is
true of Cabinet appointments; it is even more true of judicial appointments that offer life tenure.”).
17. Roughly at the mid-point of the Clinton administration, the Senate had turned down a
mere 105 of more than 2.4 million executive nominations since 1932. Claude R. Marx, U.S. Officials to Be Named Later, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 13, 1997, at A1.
18. A study by the Twentieth Century Fund (now The Century Foundation) illustrates this
point. The number of top-level executive branch positions (all requiring Senate confirmation)
grew from 196 in the Kennedy administration to 786 in the Clinton administration. G. Calvin
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The second factor is the steady increase in party-line voting in
19
Congress. Confirmation proceedings for subcabinet nominations are
not immune from this phenomenon.
Indeed, an increased number of confirmation contests implicate
a third factor. Confirmation skirmishes have tended to focus on
nominations to offices in particular areas—civil rights, environmental
protection, and national security—which deal with sensitive issues of
20
significant interest to much of the public and special interest groups.
This trend might reflect several attitudes among senators, including
their recognition that certain nominations should be scrutinized more
closely because presidents will have little regular contact with the
nominees in question, who as a practical matter will have ultimate responsibility over politically sensitive subject matters. Thus far, President George W. Bush has maneuvered around this problem, with
only one nomination to any of these offices—that of John Ashcroft as
Attorney General—sparking a closely contested vote.21
MacKenzie, The Presidential Appointment Process: Historical Development, Contemporary Operations, Current Issues, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 35, 42 tbl. 1.1 (1996). In
1993-1994, the Senate received over 77,000 presidential nominations (many of which were to
military offices). Id. at 63 tbl. 2.2. The Senate rejected none of these nominations, but over 1000
of them were withdrawn. Id.
19. According to one study, from 1985 until 1993, the highest percentage of party-line votes
in Congress in a given year was 13% in 1991. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 168. This same study
indicated that from 1993 through 1999, the percentage of party-line votes ranged from 26 to
40%. Id. These statistics reflect general legislative activity within Congress. My point is not that
increases in party-line voting are unique to the confirmation process but rather that the latter
process does not appear to be immune to the general phenomenon.
20. See id. at 168-72 (describing the trend over the past four decades toward contests in the
Senate over nominations to offices with responsibility for civil rights, environmental protection,
and national security).
21. Shortly before publication of this Essay, Theodore Olson, President Bush’s nominee to
be Solicitor General, faced tough questioning in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Eric Lichtblau, Echoes of Ashcroft Heard at Solicitor General Hearing, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A24. Many Democratic senators were openly skeptical about his nomination because as a private citizen Olson had been a fiercely partisan critic of many policy initiatives of the Clinton administration, including many laws enacted during the preceding eight
years. Id. Olson tried to deflect the harsh questioning by pledging to defend all federal laws,
even those with which he vigorously disagreed. Id.; see infra note 60 and accompanying text. Olson is one of four top-level Justice Department nominees who had their nominations delayed as
fallout from an intense partisan conflict over whether the Judiciary Committee will continue to
allow one senator the privilege of defeating a nomination to a judgeship in his or her state by
returning a “blue slip” in opposition to the nomination. Some senators wish to adopt a new
practice requiring both senators from a state to submit blue slips in order to stop further proceedings on a judicial nomination in their state. Helen Dewar & Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats
Block Justice Picks; Senators Protest GOP Change in Judicial Vetting, WASH. POST, May 4,
2001, at A1; see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, senators take special interest in nominations to federal
offices in their respective states and also to leadership positions
within institutions that are closely aligned with Congress, particularly
commissions and agencies. Hence, presidents risk protracted confirmation contests with respect to such positions unless they negotiate
22
with interested senators.
The fifth factor influencing the frequency of contested subcabinet nominations is that Senate rules and traditions have made it easier for one or only a few senators to defeat such nominations without
23
a full Senate vote. A longstanding, official rule of the Senate, in ef24
fect until earlier this year, required a majority of committee members to recommend a nomination formally before the nomination
could reach the Senate floor for a final vote. While this rule never was
invoked to prevent a cabinet nomination from reaching the Senate
25
floor, it routinely was applied to impede subcabinet nominations,
22. See Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 634 (1989) (describing and analyzing the proprietary interests that
members of Congress have in the staffing and agendas of agencies and commissions). Particularly during President Clinton’s second term, there were protracted contests over nominations
to the Securities and Exchange, Federal Communications, Federal Election, and United States
Sentencing Commissions. These contests ended only after the contending sides cut deals to
achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes. See infra note 26.
23. Senate Rule XXVI provides in pertinent part, “[t]he vote of any committee to report a
measure or matter shall require the concurrence of a majority of the members of the committee
who are present.” Senate Rule 26.7(a)(3).
24. For an example of the rare change in Senate rules approved in January 2001, see infra
note 42.
25. Enforcement of this rule has led to the defeat of many subcabinet nominations over the
years. Perhaps the most notorious instance was the Judiciary Committee’s split vote in 1997
over Clinton’s nomination of Bill Lann Lee. See GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 170-71, 267-70
(describing the contest over and ultimate rejection of Lee’s nomination because of a split vote
on the Judiciary Committee that strictly followed party lines).
The fact that politicians understand that this rule will not be applied to cabinet nominees helps to explain the greater numbers of subcabinet nominees who withdraw their nominations. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that within the last ten years, four cabinet nominees have
been forced to withdraw their nominations: President Clinton’s nominations of Zoe Baird and
Kimba Wood as Attorney General and Bobby Inman as Defense Secretary and President
George W. Bush’s nomination of Linda Chavez as Labor Secretary. GERHARDT, supra note 4,
at 166, 244, 247; Richard L. Berke, Bush’s Transition Largely A Success, All Sides Suggest, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, at A1. The full significance of these forced withdrawals is not clear. A
forced withdrawal is not the same as the formal rejection of a nominee because it does not require any formal action by the Senate. The people whose nominations have been withdrawn
might have been confirmed, though no one will ever know for sure. Moreover, it is difficult if
not impossible to prove precisely which nominations have been withdrawn. For instance, it is
entirely conceivable that a forced withdrawal might not have occurred because of a significant
loss of support in the Senate but because of other factors, such as the loss of confidence of a
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thereby allowing senators to defeat a nomination either by a negative
vote from a majority of a committee or a tie vote in a committee.
Moreover, nominations effectively can be nullified by committee
chairs’ refusals to schedule hearings or votes on the nominations in
question, or by the Senate Majority Leader’s refusal to schedule final
floor debates or votes on pending nominations.
A sixth factor intensifying contests over subcabinet nominations
is the amenability of subcabinet nominations to logrolling, or trading.
One can imagine a vicious cycle emerging: (1) presidents are unlikely
to invest much political capital in subcabinet nominations generally;
(2) senators understand the small investments made by presidents in
such nominations; (3) senators understand further that it might not
take much to steer presidents into making the nominations senators
prefer or conceding to senators on another point in exchange for
nominating the president’s first choice; and (4) presidents begin to resist cutting any deals over these nominations without getting something of value in return.26 High-profile contests over subcabinet nominations, which are rare, do not fit this pattern. These protracted
contests involved nominations in which presidents felt invested personally or ideologically, and some senators were inclined to make
presidents pay for their investment. Indeed, the few instances in
which the Senate has rejected former or present Senate colleagues’
nominations have arisen under precisely such circumstances. The
Senate’s rejection of Andrew Jackson’s nominee Martin Van Buren
as Ambassador to Great Britain27 and Harry Truman’s nominee Mon
President in the nominee or a nominee’s preference to save the President from the political or
other fallout resulting from a bruising confirmation contest.
26. See, e.g., Tom Diener, Agreement Breaks Logjam on Clinton Appointees, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 24, 2000, at 10A (reporting an agreement reached between President
Clinton and Senate leaders for Clinton’s nomination of their preferred candidate to a seat on
the Federal Election Commission in exchange for final Senate votes on sixteen of his judicial
nominations); David E. Rovella, Sentencing Commission Returns to Business of Fair Justice,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July 24, 2000 (reporting the consequences of a protracted contest between President Clinton and Senate leaders over naming commissioners of the U.S. Sentencing Commission); Senate Is Set to Vote on 16 Clinton Judicial Nominees, ST. LOUIS POST
DISPATCH, May 24, 2000, at A9 (reporting President Clinton’s agreement to give Republican
Senate leaders their preferred candidate on the Federal Election Commission in exchange for
final votes on sixteen of his judicial nominations).
27. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 55-57 (1953). In 1831,
President Jackson gave his Secretary of State Martin Van Buren a recess appointment as Minister to Great Britain as part of a scheme to reorganize his cabinet to reduce the influence of Vice
President John Calhoun within his administration. Id. at 55. In January 1832, the Senate considered and rejected Van Buren’s nomination, with Calhoun casting the decisive, tie-breaking vote
against it. Id. at 57.
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Wallgren as chairman of the National Security Resources Board, an
agency charged with the critical task of planning the industrial mobilization of the country for national defense, were examples of this circumstance.28
B. Norm Ambiguation and Beyond
Norm ambiguation can create a context in which development of
a new norm is possible. That is, new norms are more likely to develop
when there is conflict over the meaning or status of an existing
norm.29 Such conflict is evident in the recent uncertainty over whether
sitting U.S. Attorneys should offer to resign to give newly elected
presidents the chance to replace them. Before Bill Clinton’s election,
presidents expected that such resignations would be offered.30 After
Clinton’s inauguration, several sitting U.S. Attorneys balked at offering to resign their posts once the Senate confirmed Janet Reno as
President Clinton’s Attorney General.31 After becoming Attorney
General, Reno had made what she thought was the routine request
that sitting U.S. Attorneys submit their resignations to her, so she
could consider whether to reappoint them. She did not expect negative backlash because similar requests had been made by her predecessors in the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations and honored
by previous U.S. Attorneys. Their refusals to tender their resignations
embarrassed Reno, and, in fact, the desire to cause Reno embarrass-

28. Id. at 212. In 1948, President Truman’s close friend and former colleague in the Senate,
Mon Wallgren, lost his bid to be reelected as Governor of Washington. Id. A year later, the
President nominated Wallgren as chair of the National Security Resources Board. Id. The
nomination met stiff and ultimately fatal opposition in the Senate because most senators believed Wallgren’s principal qualification for the job was that he was President Truman’s close
personal friend. Id. With only one deviation, the committee reviewing his nomination rejected it
by a strict party-line vote, 7-6, and the nomination died in committee. Id. at 213. Subsequently,
President Truman nominated Wallgren to the Federal Power Commission, and the Senate confirmed the nomination, 47-12. Id. at 214.
29. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 302.
30. The one wrinkle appears to be that from Gerald Ford’s presidency through George
H.W. Bush’s presidency, U.S. Attorneys in New York had been allowed to finish their four-year
terms before offering to resign even if their terms extended into the term of a newly elected
President. Andy Newman, White House Seeks Resignations of Three Prosecutors in New York,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at A1.
31. David Johnston, Attorney General Seeks Resignations from Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1993, at A1.
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ment may have been the impetus for the refusals.32 After sending
mixed signals on whether all sitting U.S. Attorneys should proffer
their resignations to Attorney General Ashcroft,33 President George
W. Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft requested the resignations
of all but a few of the nation’s U.S. Attorneys.34 Not a single Republican leader questioned the propriety of Bush’s and Ashcroft’s actions.
The absence of a governing norm, rather than conflict over its
status, provides an even clearer invitation for actors to expand their
authority. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidents have
35
tended to expand the number and policymaking authority of White
House staff members who are not subject to Senate confirmation.
These expansions have given presidents a reliable process for reviewing policymaking efforts throughout their administrations. In
fact, President George W. Bush consolidated within his White House
36
staff the duties of evaluating possible judicial nominees and refining
37
his administration’s budgetary priorities.
The true import of these recent trends is difficult to assess. A
fundamental precondition of a norm is that its breach provoke sanction or retaliation. If neither of President Bush’s recent actions—re-

32. See Lisa Hoffman, D’Amato Says Clinton Tried to Stack the Deck with Friendly Prosecutor, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 1994, at 14A (reporting that some observers agree
that resignation requests are common when a new administration takes office).
33. See John Caher, Schumer Lobbying for U.S. Attorneys; Says Justice Department Not
Seeking Resignations, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 2001, at 1 (noting that at the time it was uncertain
whether Clinton-appointed prosecutors would be asked to resign).
34. Newman, supra note 30, at A1.
35. Two figures illustrate this point. First, President Nixon had only one lawyer serving as
his official counsel, while President Clinton in his final year in office employed at least 19 fulltime lawyers in the White House Counsel’s Office. At present, President Bush employs approximately a dozen full-time lawyers in the office. Second, the size of the White House staff
assisting the President has grown from 53 in 1941 to 366 in 1990. JOHN P. BURKE, THE
INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY: ORGANIZING AND MANAGING THE WHITE HOUSE FROM FDR
TO CLINTON 13 tbl. 1-1 (2d ed. 2000) (illustrating the change in the size of the White House staff
from 1941 through 1990). In 1996, one analyst concluded that “[t]he most activist presidents
have the largest staffs.” 2 MICHAEL NELSON, GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 1086 (2d ed. 1996).
Near the end of Clinton’s presidency, there were 386 people listed on the White House staff.
36. See Neil A. Lewis, President Moves Quickly on Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
at A34 (noting President Bush’s desire to make judicial appointments a priority of his administration and describing the system he put in place within the White House to facilitate and expedite judicial nominations).
37. President Bush has assembled a team of advisers from within the White House to review and resolve departmental appeals regarding his administration’s budgetary priorities. Peter
Grier, Cheney’s Vice-Presidential Load Is Heaviest Yet, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 2001,
at USA, 1; Susan Page, Cheney Gives Up Ambition, Gains Power, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2001, at
1A.
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questing the resignation of U.S. Attorneys and expanding the size and
authority of his White House staff—has triggered any sanction, then
he probably has not violated a governing norm.
The difference between a practice that triggers sanctions and one
that does not is the difference between a norm and a practice that is
not, or perhaps is no longer, a norm. As will be discussed in the following section, this difference is crucial for political leaders to keep in
mind when they are trying to maneuver through, or reform, the federal appointments process.
II. REFORM AND NORMS
This section considers ways norm theory can illuminate the amenability of the federal appointments process to reform. First, I discuss
the structural impediments to formal alterations in the design of the
federal appointments process. Second, I suggest how norms can be
used to redress some major problems in judicial selection. Third, I
sketch the requisite conditions for successful norm entrepreneurship
in reforming the appointments process.
A. Impediments to Formal Alterations
Norms provide a useful perspective for analyzing the capacity of
the federal appointments process for reform, because norms—unlike
the formal structures and rules governing federal appointments—can
sometimes be unstable. Presidents and senators rarely agree to any
formal alterations in the structure of the appointments process unless
they are convinced change is in their mutual institutional interests.
The constitutional structure of the appointments process has never
changed, and formal Senate rules governing confirmation proceedings
have changed only rarely. Therefore, persuading presidents and senators to modify or abandon their prerogatives is difficult at best.38
The rarity and difficulty of formal structural or rule changes
should not, however, mean that such change is impossible. Indeed,
two changes within the last year signal national political leaders’
willingness to reform the process when it is clearly in their mutual in38. Of course, incremental change may occur over time. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note
4, at 67-69 (discussing the evolution of the expectation regarding the personal appearances and
testimony of judicial nominees before the Senate); id. at 267-72 (discussing the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, enacted in 1998); id. at 275-78 (discussing civil service reform); id. at 321-24
(discussing the change in the Senate from closed to open hearings).
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terest to accomplish it. First, in the fall of 2000, Congress enacted the
Presidential Transition Act of 2000,39 which, inter alia, grants transition teams greater access to governmental information. Access to information should assist political appointees in acclimating to their
new responsibilities prior to inauguration. In some ways, nominees’
access to such information may serve to expedite their confirmation
40
process. There is no hard evidence to explain why Congress streamlined the transition process shortly before the fall election. The timing
of this reform raises, however, an inference that members of Congress
from both parties might have agreed to the reform because they foresaw a tight election in which either candidate had an equal chance to
win and, thus, to benefit from the new enactment’s provisions.
A second change is more telling. The unprecedented 50-50 split
in the Senate set the stage for Senate leaders to abandon the longstanding rule that a nomination could be forwarded to the full Senate
for a final vote only if a majority of a Senate committee had formally
41
recommended that it be forwarded. On January 5, 2001, Republicans
agreed to allow equal representation of Democrats on all Senate
committees in exchange for an agreement allowing the Majority
Leader to schedule a floor vote on a nomination on which there has
42
been a tie vote in committee. With this change, Democrats gained an

39. Presidential Transition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-293, 114 Stat. 1035 (amending
Presidential Transition Act of 1963, 3 U.S.C. § 120 (1963)). The basic purpose of the Act was to
streamline the transition phase and simplify the financial disclosure process for presidential appointees.
40. Neal Becton, Disclosure Reports Go Online at USDA; Forms Will Help Federal Appointees, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2001, at A13 (acknowledging that the primary purpose of the
Presidential Transition Act was to “streamline the transition phase” by “simplify[ing] the financial disclosure” forms and requirements).
41. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; infra note 42 and accompanying text.
42. Section 3 of the approved resolution provides,
If a committee has not reported out a legislative item or nomination because of a tie
vote, then, after notice of such tie vote has been transmitted to the Senate by that
committee and printed in the Record, the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader
may, only after consultation with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the committee, make a motion to discharge such legislative item or nomination, and time for debate on such motion shall [take place] . . . in order: Provided, That following the use
or yielding back of time, a vote occur on the motion to discharge, without any intervening action, motion, or debate, and if agreed to it be placed immediately on the . . .
Executive Calendar (in the case of a nomination).
S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001) (enacted). The Judiciary
Committee’s 9-9 vote on the nomination of Olson as Solicitor General, split strictly along party
lines, provided the Senate leadership its first opportunity to take advantage of this rule change
to bring a closely contested nomination to the floor of the Senate that would not have been pos-

GERHARDT.DOC

1700

06/08/01 1:54 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1687

equal voice on every committee and Republicans prevented Democrats from using that equal voice to bar full Senate consideration of
contested nominations. The bargain was a function of the relative
numerical strengths of the two parties in the Senate.
B. Institutional Norms and Reform
In this subsection, I examine how existing norms can be used to
address two major problems in the appointments process. These
problems are (1) inordinate delays in processing judicial nominations
and (2) inappropriate questioning of judicial nominees (including, but
not limited to, an excessive focus on nominees’ characters or, in the
case of judicial nominees, on their judicial ideologies).43
1. Delays. Democrats complained about delays in processing
judicial nominations throughout the Clinton presidency. By the end
of the administration, two disturbing facts had become clear. First,
the average numbers of days from the occurrence of a vacancy to a
presidential nomination, as well as the average number of days from
44
the nominations to final Senate action, were extraordinarily long.

sible under the earlier set of rules. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Committee Is Split by Party on a Bush
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2001, at A1.
43. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 117 (1994) (criticizing the litmus testing of judicial nominees). But see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 419-22 (1994)
(review of STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)) (suggesting that probing judicial nominees’ prospective ideologies is not a threat to their particular or to general judicial independence).
44. The length of the delays between the President’s making nominations and the Senate’s
final actions on the nominations is striking for two reasons. First, the average number of days
from the occurrence of a judicial vacancy to President Clinton’s formal nomination to fill the
vacancy was 536 days in 1998-99, 690 in 1994, and 753 in 1993, the latter two constituting the
longest delays in American history. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 124. The only other President
with remotely similar delays was President George H.W. Bush in his first year in office, during
which the average number of days from vacancy to nomination was 682. Id. at 125.
The average number of days between nominations and final Senate action was 201 for
the 105th Congress (1997-1998). Id. at 46 (indicating the average number of days between
nomination and final Senate action during congressional terms from 1977 to 1998). In contrast,
the average number of days between nomination and Senate final action in President Clinton’s
first year in office was 83. Id. During President Carter’s four years in office, the average number
of days between nomination and final Senate action ranged from 38 in the Ninety-fifth Congress
(1977-1978) to 90 in the Ninety-sixth Congress (1979-80). Id. During President Reagan’s eight
years in office, the average number of days between nomination and final Senate action ranged
from 32 in the Ninety-seventh Congress (1981-1982) to 144 in the 100th Congress (1987-1988).
Id. During President George H.W. Bush’s single term, the average number of days from nomi-
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Second, Clinton had failed to fill nearly one hundred judicial vacancies.45
The first things to appreciate about this data are their causes. Divided government, an already unstable environment for norms, was
further exacerbated by hard feelings between Republican congressional leaders and a President whom they impeached and tried to re46
move from office. Even so, the other cause was a norm—the traditional slow-down during presidential election years.47
With George W. Bush in the White House, the dynamic has been
different. Republicans control the White House and the Senate for
48
the first time since the first six years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.
Moreover, President Bush has already demonstrated in his first few
months in office how adhering to norms can help to secure desired
nation to final Senate action ranged from 78 in the 101st Congress (1989-1990) to 138 in the
102nd Congress (1991-1992). Id.
45. Lewis, supra note 36, at A34.
46. For a discussion of the extraordinary conflict between President Clinton and the congressional leadership culminating in and extending beyond his impeachment, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF
PRESIDENT CLINTON 199-216 (1999) (describing the “culture wars” in which President Clinton
was a “polarizing figure”); see also BENJAMIN GINSBURG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY
OTHER MEANS: POLITICIANS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO
WHITEWATER 25 (1999) (“[W]hen divided partisan control of government does coincide with
sharp cleavages between the two parties, the importance of institutional conflict relative to electoral competition is likely to increase. This state of affairs has characterized American politics
since the Vietnam and Watergate eras.”).
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (indicating that the longest delays in the
number of days between nominations and final Senate actions regarding them have been in
presidential-election years for each of the past three presidents); see also Sheldon Goldman,
Bush’s Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 284 (1993) (“Traditionally,
minimal confirmation activity occurs during presidential election years, especially when the
Senate is controlled by one party and the White House by another.”).
48. Indeed, Republicans control the White House and the Congress for the first time since
Dwight Eisenhower’s first term. Of course, the fact that the same party controls the White
House and Congress hardly ensures a harmonious appointments process. A small but powerful
contingent of Republican senators resisted and delayed (though failed to nullify) several of
President Eisenhower’s appointments (particularly his nominations to positions responsible for
foreign policy and his nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Justice), see 2 STEPHEN E.
AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 56-61, 129 (1984), while President Hoover, during
whose administration Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress, endured
some notable confirmation contests, including the rejection of his Supreme Court nominee John
J. Parker. See HARRIS, supra note 27, at 127-32 (describing the battle over Parker’s nomination). Nor did the fact that Democrats controlled both institutions during Carter’s presidency
and the first two years of Clinton’s presidency spare either of those men from numerous frustrating confirmation contests. The extent to which George W. Bush’s record on appointments
will be harmonious remains to be seen, though he and his staff have tried to learn from past
presidents’ (particularly Bush’s father’s) performances in office. Richard L. Berke, Bush Shapes
His Presidency with Sharp Eye on Father’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A1.
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appointments. Particularly instructive are his adherence to three
norms—senatorial courtesy, moderate political rhetoric, and advance
planning for appointments. Senatorial courtesy is an especially durable norm.49 President Bush took advantage of it in successfully securing the appointments of three cabinet officers.50 Republican senators
also expect Bush to defer to their suggested nominees for judicial va51
cancies in their respective states.
When it comes to Supreme Court nominations, national political
leaders expect the President to nominate sitting judges to the Court, a
52
norm that has developed during the last two decades. Obviously,
complying with the norm by nominating a sitting judge to the Court
would increase the chance of a relatively smooth confirmation. This is
especially true if the judge is someone who enjoys the backing of
powerful or influential senators, as was the case with Justice Breyer.53
If presidents were looking for a relatively smooth or quick confirmation hearing for their Supreme Court nominee, then they would be
well advised to deploy both of these norms in making a nomination:
they would be wise to nominate a person who has been a sitting judge
and who enjoys strong support among key senators.

49. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy that John Tower is the only
senator ever rejected as a cabinet nominee, while the Senate’s rejection of President Grant’s
nomination of George Williams to the Supreme Court in 1873 was the last time the Senate rejected the nomination of a senator to the Court. See GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 115, 150 (discussing the Senate’s rejection of Williams as President Grant’s nominee to the Supreme Court).
50. The three cabinet officials are John Ashcroft (former Missouri senator) as Attorney
General, Spencer Abraham (former Michigan senator) as Energy Secretary, and Norman
Mineta (former representative) as Transportation Secretary. While Mineta’s easy confirmation
does not fit a narrow conception of senatorial courtesy because he was not a senator before being nominated and confirmed as President Clinton’s last Secretary of Commerce, it is not unusual for representatives who are well known in the Senate to enjoy a similar degree of deference as senators in the confirmation process. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 143-44, 147-48.
51. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
52. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 291-326 (1999) (describing
Supreme Court nominations since President Reagan nominated Sandra Day O’Connor to the
Court in 1982, the last time a person with substantial political experience was nominated to the
Court).
53. See id. at 323:
[O]n May 10, Clinton met with one of [Breyer’s] most persistent advocates, Senator
Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) . . . . Kennedy also assured Clinton that Breyer’s close past
warm connections as counsel with the Judiciary Committee would indubitably guarantee a quiet and bipartisanly successful confirmation hearing. Now sufficiently persuaded, and eager to fill the Blackmun vacancy without further delay, the president
nominated [Breyer] . . . .
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If, however, presidents wanted to revive the lapsed norm of appointing political leaders to the Court, their best bet might be to take
advantage of the likely deference senators would give to nominations
of their congressional colleagues. The argument for nominating a current or former member of Congress is that her keen understanding of
political institutions and policymaking will benefit the Court and the
nation. Though such a nominee would bear the burden of persuading
her colleagues that she appreciates the differences between legislating
and judging, it might be easier for someone who is liked by most senators to win the opportunity to satisfy this burden than it would be for
someone unknown to them.
The second norm followed by President George W. Bush to facilitate confirmation of his cabinet nominees is assembling a knowledgeable and competent staff to assist with transition matters (in54
cluding recommending appointments) well before Election Day.
Presidents who have followed this practice, such Reagan, have had
relatively smooth transitions. For Bush, following the model culminated in a huge payoff—he had the quickest and smoothest confirmation of a cabinet in decades. His nominees all were confirmed within
twelve days;55 in contrast, President Kennedy’s cabinet nominees re56
quired an average of 2.4 months to be confirmed, and Bill Clinton’s
nominees averaged 8.5 months to be confirmed.57
The third norm that President Bush followed to facilitate the
smooth confirmation of his cabinet nominees relates to the “framing
58
effect” of his rhetoric in characterizing his nominees. Characterizing
nominees in modest terms has the effect of lowering expectations
54. See Berke, supra note 25, at A1 (describing in detail Bush’s transition plans and models).
55. Brian Blomquist, Ashcroft Confirmed in 58-42 Senate Vote, N.Y. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at
5.
56. Editorial, A Cumbersome Process, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 13, 2001, at B16.
57. Id.
58. I refer to both President Bush’s early planning for his transition and his employment of
moderate rhetoric as compliance with certain institutional norms rather than strategies. Early
planning is arguably an institutional norm that operates largely within the executive branch, particularly the Executive Office of the President. While no one within the executive branch has
any formal power to sanction Bush for his failure to plan early for a transition, it is possible that
his failure to do so might alienate some key administration insiders, who could retaliate by
making damaging leaks or using their influence to impede appointments with which they disagree. The use of moderate rhetoric operates as a different institutional norm, which largely operates between the President and the Senate. It is possible to infer the existence of the latter
norm from the costs imposed on presidents and their nominees when they fail to employ moderating rhetoric.
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about the merits of these nominees59 and of setting terms of debate
that are conducive to confirmation.60 President Bush did not oversell
his nominees. He told stories about their lives that made them appealing figures but did not raise expectations about their respective
qualifications.61 In contrast, presidents who oversold the quality of
some nominees have paid dearly for their exaggerations.62
2. Attacking Presidential Nominees. From the beginning of the
republic to the present day, presidents have invariably considered

59. For a similar conclusion, see DAVID YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 168-70 (1999) (suggesting that
presidents will act in certain ways, such as using moderate rhetoric, to preempt conflict with the
Senate).
60. Just like President Bush, nominees can take advantage of the framing effect of their
own moderate rhetoric in the confirmation process. Nominees can frame the terms of debate
that facilitate their successful confirmations. Theodore Olson repeatedly pledged to the Senate
Judiciary Committee that he would enforce and defend all federal laws, including those that he
had personally opposed as unconstitutional prior to his nomination as President Bush’s Solicitor
General. Democrats Grill Pick for Solicitor General, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 6,
2001, at A3; Lichtblau, supra note 21, at A24. Through these pledges, Olson, Ashcroft, and Gale
Norton pressured the opposition to debate their nominations in terms of the credibility of their
pledges rather than the merits or appeal of their respective ideologies. The effectiveness of
these pledges is evident from the fact that senators from both parties joined together to confirm
Ashcroft and Norton. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Olson’s pledge did not, however, preclude his nomination from serious opposition on the Judiciary Committee. The Committee split evenly along party lines with Democrats voting against the nomination because of
their concerns over the veracity of Olson’s testimony about the degree of his involvement in certain anti-Clinton activities. Lewis, supra note 42, at A1.
Until this year, several Republican senators, none more aggressively than John Ashcroft, had opposed subcabinet nominees (such as Bill Lann Lee) even though they had pledged
to defend all federal laws in spite of their personal doubts about their constitutionality. One
could infer from such opposition the belief that subcabinet nominees’ ideological views inevitably will guide their performances in office. The fact that Republican senators recently have
urged the confirmation of nominees on the ground that their personal pledges to enforce all
federal laws is much more relevant to their confirmation than their personal ideologies raises
the interesting question of how these senators will treat Democratic nominees who make similar
pledges in the future.
61. See Stephen Hess, The Presidency; Transition: Less Seems to Be More; It’s Been a Good
Month for Bush, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at M1 (noting President Bush’s reference to the
“wonderful stories” many of his cabinet nominees’ lives embodied). Similarly, nominees whose
life stories made wonderful copy during their confirmation proceedings met with little resistance. See GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 184 (noting that Justice Scalia’s status as the first Italian
American nominated to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas’ rise from abject poverty, and Justice Ginsburg’s status as the “Thurgood Marshall of the feminist movement” ultimately helped
to secure each nominee’s confirmation).
62. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 127-28 (noting problems created by the unreasonably high expectations triggered by President George H.W. Bush’s characterization of
Clarence Thomas as the “best qualified” nominee for the Supreme Court and President
Clinton’s promise to have the most ethical administration in history).
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prospective nominees’ likely judicial philosophies in making decisions
about whom to nominate to the federal bench, and senators traditionally have viewed the confirmation process as the most significant
political check on presidential judicial nominations.63 In exercising
this check, senators generally viewed their core responsibility as determining the fitness of a judicial nominee, and they generally considered ideology as central to their evaluations of a judicial nominee’s
fitness.
President George W. Bush’s Chief Counsel, Alberto Gonzalez,
acknowledged the relevance of ideology in making judicial nominations. He noted that he and his staff ask prospective judicial nominees
about their “philosophy.” “We ask how they construe statutes, how
do they resolve disputes and what do they believe is the appropriate
64
role of judges.” Gonzalez distinguishes such questioning from litmus
tests—asking nominees questions that seek a direct answer to how
they would vote on a given case, such as abortion—a practice he denies the White House is using.65 Both the distinction and the denial
are disingenuous.
One longstanding norm within the executive branch is for presidents to choose judicial nominees based primarily on their judicial
ideologies. Indeed, a prospective nominee’s ideology will signal to
those selecting possible nominees how the nominee likely would rule
in a set or class of cases and, therefore, how the person would rule in
any particular case. Having a set of questions designed to elicit information about likely ideologies is, then, nothing more than a test for
filtering acceptable candidates from the pool of aspiring nominees.
That is, the focus on ideology is itself a kind of litmus test, for it seeks
to identify the prospective nominees with the “right” kind of ideology. Mr. Gonzalez no doubt appreciates that many senators will
probe nominees about their likely ideologies. Some senators (particularly from the President’s party) are likely to trust the judgment
and representations of the White House regarding a particular nomination. Others who know that a President is having his prospective
nominees screened for their ideologies likely will want to know and,
indeed, claim the right to evaluate what those ideologies are. Mr.
Gonzalez disclosed that his staff engages in routine questioning of
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 128-31, 162-64.
Lewis, supra note 36, at A34.
Id.
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prospective judicial nominees about their likely ideologies. For many
senators, this disclosure establishes the need to evaluate for themselves this information and how it should affect their determinations
of nominees’ fitness to serve. The dynamic in judicial selection thus
becomes a vicious cycle in which a President makes decisions about
whom to nominate based on information about their ideological preferences, and opposition party senators seek out the same information
to determine why the nominations were made and whether they
should be approved.66
If there is any problem with the search for a nominee’s ideology,
the problem is that the appointments process seems to reward distortions of nominees’ records and characters for political and other
gains. This problem is not unique to judicial selection, but it does
arise in that context frequently because of the convergence of the basic norm of senators’ granting little deference to judicial nominees
and the framing effect of their condemnation of a nomination for
purposes of influencing attitudes about it.
The Senate’s rejection of Ronnie White’s nomination to become
67
a federal district judge in Missouri is a case in point. The rejection of
White’s nomination was the Senate’s first rejection of a judicial nomination since Robert Bork’s failed nomination as an Associate Justice
in 1987. First, the event dramatically demonstrated the continued influence of political parties in the context of judicial selection. The final Senate vote on White was 55-45, which strictly followed party
lines. Second, the rhetoric of White’s opposition, led by then Missouri
Senator John Ashcroft, was filled with hyperbole. In his confirmation
hearings, White’s opponents described him as “pro-criminal,” “activist,” and even as having a “tremendous bent toward criminal activity.”68
Third, White’s rejection has had ramifications for Ashcroft and
the Republican party to this day, particularly in the form of payback,
or the propensity of senators to initiate confirmation fights in retalia-

66. There also is a temptation to imagine that there is some connection between judicial
nominees’ lifestyles or characters and their judicial philosophies. For a comprehensive critique
of the inquiries into character driven by such thinking, see generally Laura Kalman, Does Character Affect Judicial Performance?, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1385 (2000).
67. For an overview and commentary on the fate of White’s nomination, see generally
Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Smearing of a Moderate Judge, CONN. LAW TRIB., Oct. 25, 1999.
68. Id. (quoting Senator Ashcroft’s statements in opposition to White).
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tion for contests directed against their preferred nominees.69 Payback
arguably has become a standard practice in the appointments process.
Indeed, many Democratic senators already have used the Ashcroft
confirmation hearings to signal to President Bush that they were not
pleased with strongly ideological nominees such as Ashcroft and that
they would oppose them if President Bush were to make any such
nominations to the federal courts.70
Fourth, the aftermath of White’s rejection illuminates the evolving norms of modern media coverage of political events. It is well
documented that the media generally have been giving less coverage
to hard news (which people use in performing their civic duties) and
more coverage to soft news (which consists largely of speculation,
71
commentary, and preoccupation with scandal). The more outlandish
the claims made against a nominee or public official, the more likely
they will get coverage. The fact that Ashcroft’s treatment of White
might have been “racist” drew media attention72 away from his record
on nonracial matters.

69. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Character Assassin Should Not Be Attorney General,
NAT’L J., Jan. 13, 2001, at 78 (arguing that Ashcroft’s treatment of White should disqualify him
from being confirmed as Attorney General).
70. See Mike Dorning, Senate Confirms Ashcroft, 58-42; Democrats Send Bush a Warning
on Future Nominations, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2001, at A1 (quoting Democratic senators characterizing the sizeable vote against Ashcroft as “a shot across the bow” of the Bush administration); see also Paul Kane & Mark Preston, Senate Judicial Battles Loom, ROLL CALL, Mar. 19,
2001 (stating that key Democratic senators have indicated that they will not “roll over when it
comes to President Bush’s nominations to the federal bench”). Even though a central question
in Ashcroft’s confirmation hearings concerned the fairness of his treatment of White as a judicial nominee, Republicans voted for Ashcroft’s nomination en masse. See, e.g., Dorning, supra,
at A1 (describing the sources of Democrats’ opposition to Ashcroft, including their criticisms of
his treatment of Ronnie White). Only one Republican senator intimated that Ashcroft might
have been unfair or mistaken in his assessment of White. See Mike Dorning, Judge Denounced
by Ashcroft Speaks at Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2001, at A8 (describing Judge White’s testimony during the Ashcroft confirmation hearings and Republican Senator Arlen Specter’s acknowledgment of the possibility that White might not have received completely fair treatment
in White’s confirmation hearings).
71. See generally ROBERT MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY (2000) (describing the transformation in media coverage from hard to soft news); Bill Kovach & Tom Rosenstiel, Campaign Lite, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 31 (describing how over the past
decade, and particularly during the 2000 election coverage, the press has turned more of its focus to personality, speculation, and commentary than to substantive issues); Marvin Kalb, The
Rise of the “New News”: A Case Study of Two Root Causes of the Modern Scandal Coverage
10-14 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
72. See, e.g., Richard Lowry, “Conservative” and “Racist”: The Ashcroft Nomination and
the Left’s Foulest Card, NAT’L REV., Feb. 5, 2001 (arguing that mere accusations of racism are
potentially fatal, whether true or not, because of media attention and a general culture of “new
racial McCarthyism”).

GERHARDT.DOC

1708

06/08/01 1:54 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1687

Both White’s rejection and its aftermath raise serious questions
about the possibility of ever curbing distortions of records or character in Senate confirmation contests. If there is any solution to this
problem, it could be in the realm of norms. First, there was at least
one promising signal during the Ashcroft confirmation hearings that
some senators are trying to curtail or contain the norm of payback. In
casting his vote to confirm Ashcroft, Democrat Russ Feingold of Wisconsin explained that he intended his vote to be “an olive branch” to
Republicans to end the vicious cycle of payback that had been un73
dermining the appointments process. Senate Majority Leader Lott
welcomed Feingold’s gesture, and urged senators from both parties to
follow Feingold’s example.74
Second, Democrats made another important gesture toward limiting their urge for payback generated by confirmation hearings by re75
fusing to allow or support a filibuster against Ashcroft. At least
forty-one votes would have been needed to support a filibuster,76 and
there were forty-two senators who voted against Ashcroft. Nevertheless, senators have never employed a filibuster on a cabinet nomination. The practice has been to employ filibusters only for judicial
nominations, if at all;77 and the clear signals Democratic senators gave
to President Bush on judicial nominations indicate they will be less
hesitant to employ filibusters or other measures to block his judicial
nominees than they were to use such means to block his cabinet
78
nominees.

73. Alison Mitchell, By Resisting Ashcroft, Democrats Send a Signal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2001, at A14 (describing, inter alia, Senator Feingold’s statement in support of Ashcroft’s nomination).
74. See Craig Gilbert, Lott Hails Feingold’s Gesture, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 2,
2001, at A2 (quoting Senator Lott as saying, “[Feingold] showed courage . . . . [a]nd I won’t forget it”).
75. See Dorning, supra note 70, at A1 (“Only 41 senators are needed to stop a nomination
through a filibuster, although Democratic leaders said they did not use the tactic against Ashcroft because some party members considered it inappropriate for a Cabinet nomination.”).
76. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV.
181 (1997) (summarizing the historical developments of Senate filibusters and evaluating the
anti-majoritarian impact, if any, and the constitutionality of the modern filibuster).
77. See Kirk Victor, A Ticking Time Bomb in the Senate, 33 NAT’L J. 490, 490 (2001)
(“Since 1968, Senators of both parties have waged overt filibusters against 13 judicial nominees,
starting with Abe Fortas . . . .”).
78. See Ann Gearan, Ideological Battle Set; Ashcroft Fight Sends Signal About High Court
Nominees, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Jan. 28, 2001, at A3 (quoting Professor Susan Low Bloch of
Georgetown as stating, “Normally the Senate is more deferential to a Cabinet appointment than
to a life-tenured judicial appointment anyway, so if [the Ashcroft nomination] is very conten-
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Third, Democratic and Republican senators who are concerned
about misrepresentations about nominees’ records and characters can
agree to adopt new norms for themselves and their staffs when it
comes to attacking nominees. They could provide strict limits on the
kinds of contacts they or their staffs will have with both the media
and interest groups regarding prospective or pending nominations.
Presidents could adopt similar measures by restricting their staffs
from engaging in reckless or partisan leaks designed to hurt reputations of prospective nominees or foes.
Fourth, senatorial courtesy holds some promise for curbing the
zeal of a nominee’s opponents in distorting her record or character.
To be sure, senatorial courtesy is not a panacea; it certainly has not
prevented senators or interest groups from zealously opposing some
79
of their colleagues’ preferred judicial nominees. Yet, presidents often can foresee such opposition, as President Clinton surely should
have foreseen the error of refusing to consult with either of Missouri’s
two Republican senators prior to nominating Justice White. It is safe
to say such refusals are likely to exacerbate any tension or conflict
that already exists between the President and Senate delegations over
appointments matters.
The challenge for President Bush, who repeatedly promised to
80
restore civility to political debate, is to follow the successful practices
developed for easing tensions in the appointments process. One obvious tack is to look for a consensus candidate, as President Clinton did
with his two Supreme Court nominees.81 In addition, a President
could agree to consult with both senators from the nominee’s state
when the senators are from different parties, to accept only suggested
candidates who have the support of both senators, to nominate peotious then it certainly signifies that a Supreme Court nomination will be that much more contentious”).
79. Such zealous opposition helped to delay final Senate action on President Clinton’s
Ninth Circuit nominations of Marsha Berzon for two years and Richard Paez for four years.
Kathleen Sullivan, S.F. Lawyer Finally a Judge, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 10, 2000, at A4. In 2000,
the Senate confirmed the nominees, who had the strong support of the President and Senator
Barbara Boxer. Id. Boxer’s persistent support was an indispensable antidote to the opposition.
See id. (describing how Boxer held up the confirmation of a Mississippi mayor to the Tennessee
Valley Authority until action was taken on the confirmations of Berzon and Paez).
80. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, Bush Speech Attempt to Widen Support, SOUTH BEND
TRIB., Jan. 21, 2001, at A3 (describing President George W. Bush’s inaugural address and referring to Bush’s promise to restore civility to Washington).
81. See GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 296 (describing President Clinton’s Supreme Court
nominees as “consensus candidates”).
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ple with good relations to key senators, or to have senators alternate
in recommending nominations for judgeships in their respective
states.82 Presumably, one issue for President Bush will be whether to
continue (or expand) the prior practice of considering the recommendations of Senate delegations with at least one member from the
opposition party.83 Thus far, Bush has not indicated his willingness to
consult with such delegations, much less with the eighteen delegations
in which both members are Democrats.
C. Norm Entrepreneurs
Creating new norms entails risking sanctions, because it often requires violating existing norms. Presidents Clinton and George W.
Bush both made efforts to act as norms entrepreneurs, and their experiences illuminate both the risks involved and the likely explanations for their actions.
President Clinton acted as a norms entrepreneur when he made a
84
recess appointment of a federal judge in the closing days of his administration.85 In doing so, he deviated from a norm of more than
82. See, e.g., Joel Connelly, Senate Confirms Gould’s Court Appointment, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 18, 1999, at C5 (discussing the agreement reached by Washington Senators Slade Gorton, a Republican, and Patty Murray, a Democrat, to join forces to make recommendations to the President concerning all vacant judgeships in their state); Josh Goldberg,
About 30 Lawyers Apply for Federal Court Vacancy Here, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 7, 1999,
at 1 (reporting Illinois Democratic Senator Richard Durbin’s plans to consult with Illinois Republican Senator Peter Fitzgerald prior to making recommendations to the President on a
nominee for filling a judicial vacancy in Illinois).
83. There are apparent limits to President Bush’s professed desire to work with the opposition party in the appointments process: he quickly rejected the plea of some senators during the
Ashcroft confirmation hearings that he consider renominating Missouri Supreme Court Justice
Ronnie White to a federal judgeship. Bush Won’t Nominate Black Missouri Judge, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3, 2001, at A3. Similarly, President Bush’s decision to abandon
consultation with the American Bar Association further indicates his resistance to taking any
unusual steps in building bridges with at least one mainstream organization with strong ties to
both parties. Moreover, President Bush indicated to Washington state’s two Democratic senators that they would have no special say in recommending candidates for judicial nominations;
instead, his Counsel directed that the only avenue by which they could seek some say in the administration’s judicial nominations was through negotiation with Jennifer Dunn, a Republican
representative, whom the administration designated as its “appoint-person” on nominations to
federal judgeships in the state of Washington. Les Blumenthal, White House Puts Rep. Dunn in
Driver’s Seat for Screening Bench Nominees, NEWS TRIB., Apr. 8, 2001, at B7.
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session.”).
85. The constitutionality of recess appointments of federal judges is unclear. On the one
hand, Article III provides that judges, both of the Supreme and lower federal courts, shall hold
their offices during good behavior, a phrase commonly construed to mean they serve for life
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twenty years in which presidents did not make recess appointments of
federal judges.86 The deviation was a response to North Carolina
Senator Jesse Helms’s efforts for more than six years to put holds on
judicial nominations and thereby thwart every one of President
Clinton’s nominees—all African Americans—to a North Carolina
seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.87 To maneuver around Helms’s assertion of privilege, Clinton nominated an African-American lawyer from a different state in the Fourth Circuit—
Roger Gregory from Virginia—to fill the seat initially reserved for a
North Carolinian. In late December 2000, President Clinton named
Gregory as a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit.88
The recess appointment initially put the onus on the Senate to
reject Gregory’s nomination and, thereby, risk alienating African
American voters. By late January, both of Virginia’s Republican
senators endorsed Gregory and asked President Bush to nominate
89
him for a permanent slot on the Fourth Circuit. With both of Virginia’s Republican senators on record as supporting Gregory, there
was enormous pressure on President George W. Bush to renew the
nomination, particularly in light of Senator Warner’s warning that
“[w]hen two senators take the initiative as we have done, despite the
unless they are removed for having committed an impeachable offense. Federal judges who
have been appointed by means of a recess appointment do not serve for life but instead are
prone to political retaliation, because they serve only until the end of the next congressional session, unless they are re-nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. On the other
hand, the clause of the Constitution empowering the President to make recess appointments
provides in clear language that he is entitled to fill all vacancies that may occur during the recess
of the Senate. The apparent tension in these readings can be resolved to some extent by recognizing that Article III power may be exercised by judges who are appointed in compliance with
either the Appointments Clause or the Recess Appointments Clause.
86. Editorial, Roger Gregory, Political Prop, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A18.
87. See Lyle Denniston, Politics, Race Cloud Naming of Judges to U.S. 4th Circuit; Clinton
Ducks Senate to Appoint First Black, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 2001, at 1A (recounting the objections
of Senator Helms to each of Clinton’s previous appointees to seats on the Fourth Circuit in
North Carolina based on the belief that the court does not need any additional judges). Although one of Senator Helms’s reasons for blocking President Clinton’s nominations to Fourth
Circuit seats in North Carolina was to retaliate against the Democrats’ blocking of President
George H.W. Bush’s nomination of Terence Boyle to the Fourth Circuit, President George W.
Bush has signaled that Boyle will be included among his first batch of judicial nominees as a
nominee to a seat on the Fourth Circuit. Peter Hardin, Gregory Posting Is Called Closer,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 4, 2001, at A1.
88. Brooke A. Masters & Spencer S. Hsu, Allen, Warner Endorse Gregory; GOP Lawmakers to Fight for Judge, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2001, at B9.
89. Id. In fact, in his first floor speech as Virginia’s newly elected Senator, Republican
George Allen urged President-elect Bush to re-nominate Judge Gregory for a permanent seat
on the Fourth Circuit. Id.
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unusual nominating process, I am confident the president will accede
to our wishes.”90 In May 2001, word leaked from the White House
that President Bush intended to nominate Gregory to the Fourth Cir91
cuit. If the nomination is made and confirmed, President Clinton will
have succeeded in refashioning the President’s authority to use recess
appointments to resolve impasses in the judicial selection process.92
In contrast, President Bush wasted little time after becoming
President to act as a norms entrepreneur by jettisoning the longstanding norm of allowing the American Bar Association (ABA) to
93
re-screen possible judicial nominees. Beginning in 1946 and extending through the first two years of the Clinton administration, Senate
leaders routinely requested and received formal ratings from the

90. Id.
91. Hardin, supra note 87, at A1. On March 19, 2001, President George W. Bush had formally withdrawn Gregory’s nomination to the Fourth Circuit. Peter Hardin, Bush Rescinds Offer to Gregory; Remains Eligible for Federal Bench, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 20,
2001, at A1. President Bush’s spokesperson explained that his withdrawal of Gregory’s nomination, along with over sixty others made by President Clinton, was intended to give the President
a chance to make his own decisions on whom to nominate. Id.
92. Another controversy over Clinton’s recess appointments involved Senator James Inhofe’s repeated efforts to put holds on all pending judicial nominations to retaliate against what
he perceived as President Clinton’s breach of the norm governing recess appointments—a norm
he believed required Clinton to give all senators advance notice of the names of all persons the
President intended to designate during the next recess as recess appointees. See Lott Persuades
GOP in Senate to Allow Two Judges’ Confirmation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2000,
at A10 (“Inhofe, R-Okla., accused President Bill Clinton of violating an agreement on making
temporary recess appointments, a method of bypassing the Senate confirmation process.”).
Senator Majority Leader Lott eventually cut deals with Clinton to comply with the norm and
Minority Leader Daschle to guarantee final votes on most of the pending nominations. Id. (describing Lott’s efforts to get Senate confirmation for Thomas Ambro and Joel Pisano).
93. Another recent example of a norm entrepreneur is J. Harvie Wilkinson, the Chief
Judge of the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wilkinson not only testified before the Senate in support of a
bill to abolish the seat to which Gregory had been nominated, but also went on national television to explain his opposition to filling the seat. The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television
broadcast, Jan. 5, 2000) (Transcript #6635) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). His interview
violated the norm that sitting judges generally make comments on prospective or pending judicial nominations only in private or through official channels. The norm from which Judge Wilkinson deviated presumably exists to fill the gaps left by statutes and judicial canons to guide
federal judges on issues that clearly implicate judicial selection. It is difficult to maintain, as
Judge Wilkinson did, that his sole concern was with “judicial administration,” because there
were pending nominations to each of the seats Judge Wilkinson agreed should have been abolished, and there had been prolonged contests between the President and Senator Helms to fill
those seats. Under such circumstances, one wonders not only about the risks Judge Wilkinson
undertook in deviating from the prevailing norm but also what impact those risks might have on
his future judicial career. The answer will shed some light on the relative robustness of the norm
regarding judicial involvement in judicial selection matters and whether Judge Wilkinson’s deviation signals the evolution of a new norm.
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ABA on all judicial nominations.94 Ever since the ABA gave a mixed
rating to Robert Bork in his confirmation hearings, many Republicans have doubted the organization’s claim that its ratings are based
on professional credentials and not to some extent on the ideology of
judicial nominees.95 In 1997, Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, concluded that these doubts had sufficient merit to justify doing away with the ABA’s privileged status in
testifying for or against judicial nominations.96
In spite of this edict, President Clinton continued to consult in97
formally with the ABA prior to making his judicial nominations. In
March 2001, President Bush’s Chief Counsel signaled Bush’s plan to
end the practice of giving the ABA privileged status in rating judicial
nominees.98 Ending the practice likely will remove one obstacle to
Bush’s desired judicial appointments.99 His ultimate success in this
endeavor depends on whether it will cause delays while the Democrats consult with the ABA in the confirmation phase and on whether
it consolidates the core political support Bush deems necessary.
Republican senators on the Judiciary Committee also recently
tried to act as norms entrepreneurs by trying to change the Committee’s practice regarding “blue slips.” While Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee during Clinton’s presidency, Senator Hatch allowed a judicial nomination to be permanently stalled if a single Republican
senator from the state to which the nomination was made returned a
100
blue slip signaling his or her opposition to the nominee. When Senator Hatch indicated he did not intend to allow the same practice at
the outset of Bush’s presidency, Democrats on the Committee threat-

94. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 86-88 (1997) (discussing the ABA’s rating of Truman’s
judicial nominees); id. at 120-23 (discussing the ABA’s rating of Eisenhower’s judicial nominees); id. at 167-87 (discussing the ABA’s rating of Kennedy’s judicial nominees); id. at 210-25
(discussing the ABA’s rating of Nixon’s and Ford’s judicial nominees); id. at 263-74 (discussing
the ABA’s rating of Carter’s judicial nominees); id. at 295-96, 309-35 (discussing the ABA’s
rating of Reagan’s judicial nominees); Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law
Group’s Role in Screening Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at A1 (suggesting, inter alia,
Clinton’s retention of the ABA’s role in screening or rating prospective judicial nominees).
95. Amy Goldstein, Bush Set to Curb ABA’s Role in Court Appointments, WASH. POST,
Mar. 18, 2001, at A2.
96. GERHARDT, supra note 4, at 230.
97. Lewis & Johnston, supra note 94, at A1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Dewar & Edsall, supra note 21, at A1.
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ened to filibuster all of Bush’s judicial nominations and block any
Committee vote on pending Justice Department nominations until
they could work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement regarding
blue slips.101 Democrats subsequently modified their strategy to allow
a unanimous vote on Bush’s nominee for Deputy Attorney General
but otherwise to use pending Justice Department or judicial nomina102
tions as bargaining chips in negotiations over blue slip policy. Once
President Bush formally made his first set of eleven judicial nominations, he included at least one on which the home-state senators might
disagree, precipitating further power-plays by Senator Hatch and
Democrats over scheduling and possible delays of confirmation
hearings for the initial group of nominees.103 Republican senators’ ultimate success as norms entrepreneurs depends on avoiding filibusters
and maintaining their control of the Senate.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have sketched the relevance of norm theory to
the federal appointments process. Norms such as senatorial courtesy
apply differently to different political appointments, and apply with
different intensity and to different degrees, depending on such factors
as the relative numbers of offices to which nominations are made, the
tenure and scope of responsibility of the offices in question, the relative ease of defeating certain appointments in committee, and the
relative robustness and certainty of the applicable norms. Norm theory illuminates ways national political leaders can act within the appointments process as entrepreneurs, but suggests that they must risk
sanctions for violating existing norms. The recent actions of Presidents Clinton and Bush and leading Republicans as norms entrepreneurs—Clinton in his recess appointment of Roger Gregory to the
Fourth Circuit, Bush in barring the ABA from having any privileged
status in rating judicial nominees, and Republican senators in trying
to revise the use of blue slips—illustrate the risks and possible pay101. Id.
102. See Douglas Turner, Schumer Balks over Bush Court Nominees, BUFF. NEWS, May 10,
2001, at A1 (quoting Democratic Senator Charles Schumer’s description of how the White
House must meet Democrats in its selection of judges).
103. See Lee Davidson, Hatch Threatens Tit-for-Tat Tactic, DESERET NEWS, May 12, 2001,
at A1 (describing partisan feuds over several nominees); Turner, supra note 102, at A1 (identifying nominees who are potential targets for Democratic opposition).
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offs. The risks and possible payoffs are the same in all three cases: alienating senators from the opposing party in an effort to preserve or
expand the norm entrepreneurs’ respective appointments authority.
It is too early to tell whether these leaders’ actions have been
fruitful. It is not, however, too early to assess what their actions tell us
about the relevance of norms to reform of the appointments process.
Their actions are reminders that the driving force of this system is the
informal rules developed by the very parties the rules need to constrain. These rules are not immutable. Appreciating their nature and
the political risks of noncompliance are crucial for anyone interested
in charting a successful path through the federal appointments process.

